Drug

THE DRUG PROBLEM STILL GROWS

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL
OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 13, 1972

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the failure of this country to stop or even slow the soaring rate of drug addiction has left it at the mercy of this cancerous habit which knows no mercy.

Heroin addiction is the greatest single cause of crime, and that problem too is worsening—up 33 percent in recent years. Heroin addicts spend more than $5 billion a year on their habit, making criminal narcotics traffic one of America's largest industries. That $5 billion is paid by the victims of the millions of burglaries, robberies and thefts committed by heroin addicts each year. It amounts to a "heroin tax" of $100 a year for every American family of four.

Heroin addiction is no longer isolated in the urban ghetto. It has spread to all parts of society. Nor is heroin addiction an isolated problem of the addicts. It is a serious problem that affects everyone who is a victim of their crime.

Heroin addiction has spread to epidemic proportions. In late 1969, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated the number of heroin users in the United States to be 315,000. At the end of 1971, the estimate was 560,000.

A year ago the BNDD estimated that 5 to 6 tons of heroin were being smuggled into the United States each year. Today their estimate is 6½ to 10 tons.

A major reason for the failure of the war on drugs has been the Nation's failure to prevent Southeast Asia from emerging as a major source of heroin. One quarter to one third of the heroin entering the United States comes from Southeast Asia. If present trends continue, Southeast Asia will replace Turkey as the major source for heroin entering this country.

The reason that this Nation has been unable to prevent this is that our allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics trade. The United States does not crack down on them because officials have placed the need for airbases in Thailand, Lao mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers over the safety of this Nation's population from the drug invasion.

While a law that I authored enables aid to be cut off to countries that refuse to stop contributing to our drug problem, columnist Jack Anderson, in a column which appeared in the New York Post on Friday, October 13, points out that classified CIA documents give evidence that Southeast Asian leaders are either protecting drug smugglers, or are, themselves, participating in the traffic in illegal drugs to America.

More than $200 million in military aid annually goes to the Souvanna Phouma government in Laos. Yet one CIA document quoted by Anderson says:

> A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including generals, princes, Assembly members and province governors.

Laotian generals, it seems, are providing the transportation for drug smugglers. Ironically, according to the reports in Anderson's possession, the planes and trucks to transport the America-bound narcotics are paid for by the U.S. military programs which Congress has said should be cut off in just this kind of situation.

This secret report goes on to say, according to Anderson, that the difficulty of cutting off aid is great since "the risk of jeopardizing some part of the military is high."

Our $240 million aid to Cambodia goes to help support one of the major shipment points for Southeast Asian heroin and the unstable corrupt government that protects this operation.

Anderson goes on to quote from the report:

> If U.S. aid were withdrawn, the government's ability to withstand Communist aggression would be weakened to the point of collapse.

Are we to believe that the prospect of the collapse of a tiny corrupt government on the other side of the world is more important than the deaths of hundreds of our young people, black and white, because of heroin?

The story is no better in South Vietnam. While the Thieu regime has mouthed promises to stem the flow of heroin from its mountainous areas, Anderson quotes this report as saying, "the corruption among government, civilian, military and police officials, some of whom have been participating in the narcotics traffic themselves" makes the prospects of stopping South Vietnamese heroin traffic without drastic action very dim.

As for these drastic actions, the report is further quoted to say:

> It is not in the U.S. interests to implement an air cut-off, even to punish Vietnam for failure to control drugs.

Thailand and much of South America repeat this same depressing story. Obviously, the war on drugs has become the victim of the war in Southeast Asia.

Up to 100,000 American GI's sent to fight in Vietnam since 1969 became addicted to heroin produced and marketed by our Southeast Asian allies. This same heroin is now taking its toll in our own country.

Claims of impressive seizures, important arrests, and international cooperation can simply not hide the failures. Ridding America of the heroin plague should be a seriously pursued national goal. When we spend $60 billion to fight North Vietnam and less than $1 billion to fight drug addiction, the priorities are anything but correct.

In September 1970, a leading Federal narcotics officer said:

> Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available.

A year ago, the American people were told that opium production was being phased out in Turkey—which had in the past accounted for 80 percent of the heroin being smuggled into the United States.

al questions which should be asked.

If opium production in Turkey is being phased out, how can heroin importation—and addiction—be increasing?

And why is the overall problem worse than ever after all the calls for special action?

The answer, again, lies in the region known as the Golden Triangle where the borders of Thailand, Burma, and Laos converge. One year's crop of 700 to 1,000 tons can be refined into enough heroin to supply America's addicts for 10 years. More and more of this heroin is reaching the American market.

Southeast Asia has been a major producer of opium and has had opium addiction problems of its own for some time. But only in 1969 did the white pure No. 4 heroin prized by American addicts begin to be produced in Southeast Asia.

When it appeared, it appeared in earnest. John Ingersoll, Director of BNDD, said:

> Our first indication of the presence of (No. 4) heroin in Southeast Asia came in December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned into a stream, and in 1971, the stream turned into a torrent of heroin pouring out of the "Golden Triangle."

Since there was no indigenous demand for No. 4 heroin anywhere in Southeast Asia, its appearance signified an intention to supply the U.S. market. The first victims were our soldiers in Vietnam.

Now that many of our GI's have come home and the market for No. 4 has diminished in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian heroin is being marketed in America.

The United States has always tolerated corruption on the part of our allies in the war in Southeast Asia as long as they fight at least part of the war and follow at least some of our policies. Black marketeering, stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation and smuggling are tolerated and all are rampant. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated any differently.

A vast military and political apparatus was built up in Indochina by the United States. We ignored the fact that virtually every link in that apparatus was simultaneously becoming part of a vast opium producing, refining, and smuggling apparatus which today is well on the way to replacing Turkey as the major source of heroin entering the United States.

The basics of the development of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade are these:

In Laos, opium is grown by the Meo tribesmen we organized into General Van Pao's "secret army." In fact, once the United States began providing them with liberal food supplies to assure their allegiance, many of them were able to switch to opium as virtually their only crop.

In Burma, opium is grown by the Shan rebels, the biggest opium growers in the world. They are armed with American weapons provided by the CIA or which were acquired by trading opium with government officials in Laos and Thailand for guns supplied by—and stolen from—the U.S. military aid program.

Opium is also grown by hill tribesmen in Thailand.

Opium from Burma is transported into Thailand by remnants of the Nationalist

Chinese—KMT—forces driven out of China in 1949. These forces are armed with U.S. weapons and have been supported by the CIA. The Thai Government now uses them to patrol its rugged northern frontier with Burma and to help suppress the growing insurgency in northern Thailand.

Opium is transported by the Royal Laotian Air Force and the South Vietnamese Air Force, which have been organized, financed, and supplied by the United States, and on local commercial flights as well.

Opium and morphine-base—which is transformed into opium—are transported from Thai ports in fishing trawlers to clandestine laboratories in Hong Kong. This could not happen without government complicity.

Heroin is refined in laboratories in Thailand, Laos, Burma, and Hong Kong. In the quantity and quality of its output, Hong Kong now rivals the refining capacity of Marseilles.

From Southeast Asia, heroin has been smuggled to the United States via many routes. There have been seizures of heroin sent to the United States from Southeast Asia via the military postal system. Southeast Asian heroin is reaching the United States by way of Latin America, as well as France.

A courier ring was uncovered smuggling Southeast Asian heroin to the United States via the Philippines. Another ring was uncovered this year operating through Bangkok. Seamen from Hong Kong are also increasingly participating in the smuggling.

We ignored the drug problem in Southeast Asia until 1971, when heroin use reached epidemic proportions among our GI's in Southeast Asia. By then, it was too late. Our allies in Southeast Asia had developed a vast opium network while the United States, with its great power in Southeast Asia, patrolled the air, land, and sea, organized armies, created and destroyed governments, promoted intrigue, but ignored the opium trade.

Important members of the armed forces and governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are raking in big profits from the drug trade. They are not about to forgo these profits, at least not of their own accord.

The U.S. Army provost marshal in South Vietnam, in a 1971 report, stated that the opium trade in South Vietnam is controlled by a four-tiered pyramid. At the top are "the powers behind the scenes who can manipulate, foster, protect and promote the illicit traffic in drugs." The people comprising this group, the report stated, "may be high-level, influential political figures, Government leaders, or moneyed Chinese members of the criminal syndicates now flourishing in the Cholon section of the city of Saigon."

The provost marshal identified Tran Thien Khoi, chief of the South Vietnamese customs fraud repression division and brother of Prime Minister Tran Thien Kheim, as a "principal" in the opium traffic.

General Ngo Dzu, II Corps commander in South Vietnam and a stanch supporter of President Thieu, was identified last year as a major narcotics trafficker. Thieu promoted him after a whitewash investigation.

Gen. Ouane Rattikone controlled the largest heroin laboratory in Southeast Asia during his tenure as chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army—the only army other than that of the United States that is completely financed by the U.S. taxpayer. This laboratory was the major supplier of heroin for U.S. forces in South Vietnam at the peak of the heroin epidemic.

NBC News reported on July 15, 1971, that both President Thieu and Vice President Ky were financing their election campaigns from the narcotics traffic and labeled President Thieu's chief intelligence officer "the biggest pusher in South Vietnam." Quang's involvement in the heroin trade has been confirmed by other sources.

The Filipino courier ring broken up by BNDD in 1970 had smuggled approximately 1,000 kilograms of Southeast Asian heroin into the United States in the previous year. That was enough to supply 15 to 20 percent of the estimated U.S. consumption at the time.

On April 5, 1971, 7.7 kilos of Double U–O Globe brand Laotian heroin—the same brand produced in Gen. Ouane Rattikone's laboratories—were seized in Fort Monmouth, N.J.

On November 11, 1971, 15.5 kilos of the same brand of Laotian heroin were seized in New York City.

The new Laotian Ambassador to France was caught in April 1971 when he arrived in Paris with 60 kilograms of heroin in his suitcase. That is enough to supply 5,000 addicts for a full year.

In January 1972, U.S. customs inspectors in Honolulu broke up a smuggling ring and arrested three couriers body-carrying heroin from Bangkok to buyers in San Francisco and New York.

On April 5, 1972, a seaman was arrested in Miami with 10 kilos of Double U–O Globe brand Laotian heroin and on April 11, another seaman was arrested in New York with another 5 kilos of Southeast Asian heroin.

And on August 23, 1972, the BNDD announced the seizure of 9 kilograms of Southeast Asian heroin in New York City and the uncovering of a smuggling ring. The BNDD noted that there had been another seizure of Southeast Asian heroin in the same area the month before.

These seizures are only the tip of the iceberg. John Ingersoll of BNDD told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 27 that—

> We have reason to believe that certain ethnic Chinese criminal elements in America have geared up an operation to take advantage of the heroin availability in Southeast Asia . . . The evidence points to the establishment of a new pattern which affects places never previously of any significance to the drug traffic. As the result of actual seizures and our intelligence, we believe these shipments have come in through such diverse seaports as Norfolk, Charleston, Miami, New Orleans, Seattle, Vancouver, New York, and the Great Lakes port of Chicago.

As one Republican Congressman has said:

> Vietnam is truly coming home to haunt us. No matter what they say, . . . the first wave of this material is already on its way to our children in high school.

It is impossible to be sure just how much Southeast Asian heroin is now entering this country. NBC's estimate in a recent special broadcast was that one-third of heroin entering this country now comes from Southeast Asia. A recent report by the Strategic Intelligence Office of BNDD stated:

> More of the heroin reaching the U.S. is from this area than conventional knowledge has recognized. A recent study by BNDD chemists, involving 109 traceable heroin samples, revealed 28 (or 25.7 percent) to be of Southeast Asian origin.

The percentage of heroin entering this country that comes from Southeast Asia is increasing; the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Burma, and Thailand clearly has the potential of replacing Turkey as this country's major heroin supplier. Whether that potential is realized will depend on how the United States responds to the problem. So far, the United States has met this challenge with half measures and coverups.

Optimism in this area was counterbalanced by a Cabinet-level report dated February 21, 1972, prepared by officials from the CIA, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. According to the New York Times of July 24, the report stated that "there is no prospect under any conditions that can realistically be projected" for stemming the smuggling of narcotics in Southeast Asia.

The Cabinet level report stated:

> The governments in the region are unable and, in some cases, unwilling, to do those things that would have to be done by them if a truly effective effort were to be made. . . . The most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion, and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place.

Nelson Gross, of the State Department, insisted that there were only "unsubstantiated allegations" implicating Gen. Ouane Rattikone in the drug trade. However, General Rattikone has acknowledged his complicity, and John Warner, chief of the Intelligence Office of BNDD, has since confirmed Rattikone's complicity.

In July 1971 a congressional committee was told that—

> U.S. military authorities have provided Ambassador Bunker with hard intelligence that one of the chief traffickers is General Ngo Dzu, the commander of II Corps.

The U.S. Embassy permitted the late John Paul Vann, the senior U.S. adviser for II Corps, to respond:

> There is no information available to me that in any shape, manner or fashion would substantiate the charges.

He also indicated that General Abrams had no such information. General Dzu was then promoted. The Washington Post later obtained the secret documents whose existence had been denied and published them in June 1972.

Nelson Gross denied there was a serious problem. In a letter to the Senate committee he said: "Southeast Asia is not a major source of heroin on our market" and that "only 5 percent" and "certainly no more than 10 percent" of heroin used in the United States comes from Southeast Asia. But it was pointed out above that a survey of 109 seizures of heroin in this country by BNDD found that 26 percent came from Southeast Asia.

The Washington Evening Star-Daily News on August 19, 1972, reported on secret intelligence summaries compiled by CIA and BNDD that contain some of the facts that the administration will not acknowledge in public. The summaries stated that—

Officials of the Royal Thai Army and Customs at the several checkpoints along the road to Bangkok are usually bribed and "protection" fees prepaid by the smuggling syndicates or by the driver at the checkpoints.

The summaries also clearly explain why the United States has been unable to deal effectively with the Southeast Asia drug trade. They state:

Priorities related to requirements of the Vietnam war may limit pressures that can be applied.

The "war on drugs" has become a casualty of the war in Indochina.

Our political and military commitments to the governments of Southeast Asia have prevented any effective action to stop the narcotics traffic. These commitments are the result of our determination to fight the war in Indochina. We have allied ourselves with corrupt governments that are complicit in the drug trade and this fact is coming home to haunt us.

Ending the war in Vietnam will free us to make the narcotics traffic our number one priority in the region.

Heroin addiction in our country has brought living death to hundreds of thousands of Americans. It is a major force behind our intolerable crime rates. It is fueling the activities of organized crime.

We can no longer tolerate the narcotics traffic and we can no longer support the corrupt governments of Southeast Asia that profit from it.

In the following ways, Congress' determination to continue the war in Vietnam has prevented us from being able to crack down on the Southeast Asian heroin trade.

First. We cannot cope with the situation without admitting the depth of corruption of our allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam who are supplying heroin to the U.S. market. If these facts are admitted, support for the war would dry up immediately. Many members of Congress, and much of the rest of the Nation, have chosen, therefore, to ignore this part of the heroin problem.

Second. Congress has voted money to prop up these weak corrupt Southeast Asian governments. Exposing the scandals would threaten their fragile existence and lessen their ability to fight the war.

Third. We can never bring the necessary pressures to bear on these governments as long as we need Vietnamese soldiers, Lao mercenaries, and Thai air bases to fight this war.

The best case in point is Thailand. As a major opium grower and the conduit through which Burmese opium is smuggled, Thailand is increasingly the key to controlling the Southeast Asian drug trade.

At the same time, as we increase our reliance on air power, shift troops from South Vietnam to Thailand, and reopen air bases in Thailand, this nation becomes crucial to our warmaking effort. The war is also dependent on Thai mercenaries in Laos and South Vietnam.

As long as the United States is relying on mercenaries and air bases that are available only with the approval of the Thai Government, obviously there is a limit to how much pressure we can bring to bear on them. The war gives the corrupt Thai Government a veto power over American policy. As long as the war continues, we will never be able to pressure the Thai leaders to give up the enormous profits that they are making from the opium trade.

In the following ways, ending the war will facilitate controlling the Southeast Asian heroin trade:

First. The end of the war will free us to make a crackdown on narcotics the top priority of our relations with the nations of this area.

Second. Political settlements at the end of the war are likely to lead to the emergence of new governments in Laos and South Vietnam that would be less likely to support the opium trade. The people and governments of Laos and South Vietnam are likely to realize that, if they are serious about rebuilding their countries, they will have to root out corruption and curb the growing drug problems that are ravaging their societies; and

Third. The end of the war would completely turn the tables in Thailand. We would no longer be dependent on the Thai Government for the war effort; instead, they would be dependent on our economic aid to bolster their top heavy economy. A threat to cut off aid would, then, give us tremendous leverage.

The Thai Government could seal off the Thai-Burmese border, if they were determined to do so. Virtually all of the Burmese opium passes through Thailand. Most of it carried in large mule caravans by the KMT. Some is carried by the Burmese Shan rebels, but the KMT units tightly control the border and tax every pound of opium that crosses into Thailand. This shows that the border can be controlled. If the opium is taxed, it can be stopped. But it will require a vigorous effort by the Thai Government. The United States must pressure the Thai Government to make that effort.

The Government of Burma is unable to stop the opium traffic because the opium growing areas are controlled by rebel bands armed with American weapons—they obtain those weapons by selling opium to corrupt Thai and Laotian officials. When the war ends and the United States stops sending arms into the area, the power of the rebels will be disrupted. If corruption in Laos and Thailand were controlled and if the borders were sealed, the Burmese rebels would find it difficult to market their opium or to obtain weapons. With a shortage of weapons and money, the rebels would be weakened and it would be easier for the Burmese Government to regain control of the opium growing areas. In the past, the Burmese Government has cracked down on opium traffic when it has been able to.

In addition, ending the Vietnam war, and reorienting our foreign policy may improve our relations with Burma and make cooperative efforts more likely.

These points must be placed in the context of a full program to stem the international narcotics trade. Such an effort must include four components. There is nothing mysterious about these recommendations. Some are official administration policy and all have been discussed and advocated for a long time. But these recommendations are meaningless as long as the war continues and the Southeast Asia narcotics trade continues unchecked.

First. Direct diplomatic pressure. The United States should exert maximum pressure on other governments to crack down on the illicit production and smuggling of opium. This effort must be placed at the top of the agenda of our foreign relations. Every possible diplomatic lever, including possible reduction or cessation of foreign aid, must be brought to bear.

In this effort, the United States must use the carrot as well as the stick. Other countries, too, have an interest in halting the drug trade. They have their own opium and heroin problems. If given a realistic alternative to involvement in the drug trade, foreign countries may well find it in their interest to cooperate in international control efforts.

Unfortunately, the opium trade is an important source of income to hundreds of thousands of farmers around the world, and, in some cases, to entire national economies. Consequently, the United States must be prepared to assist in making sure that realistic alternative sources of income are available. This should include price support payments and, in the long term, investments in the areas affected to help create alternative sources of income.

Second. International cooperation. U.S. action is needed at once, but the proposed U.S. actions would be more effective if taken by an international organization. The U.S. should attempt to organize the international community to pressure offending nations to clamp down on the narcotics trade. The International Narcotics Control Board should have authority to investigate alleged noncompliance with international obligations in any nation that is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Economic sanctions, including the withholding international development funds, and possible trade restrictions, should be available as a tool of last resort in the event of persistent failure by any nation to cooperate. An effective program of eco-

 to opium producing

areas converting to other crops should be developed under international auspices. So far only a tiny step has been taken in this direction.

Third. U.S. agencies. We should strengthen the U.S. agencies that are responsible for controlling the international narcotics trade. An additional $40 million should be appropriated for the Customs Bureau and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for hiring and training specialists in drug law enforcement.

A conflict of jurisdictions between BNDD and the Customs Bureau has undermined the effectiveness of Federal control efforts. We cannot expect other nations to take us seriously when we urge cooperation if we are unable to coordinate our own efforts. Yet we have been unable to gain control over this conflict between two Federal agencies, and the conflict has repeatedly jeopardized important cases. BNDD should be assigned primary responsibility in controlling the international trade.

Fourth. Finally, increased research efforts can contribute to improving our ability to control the illicit narcotics traffic. The development of cheap, nonaddictive synthetic pain killers could make it possible to completely outlaw opium production throughout the world. If legal crops for medicinal purposes can be marked with practical tracer elements, this would make it much easier to detect opium diverted into the illegal market. And there are even indications that remote sensor devices can be developed that would permit direct detection of heroin shipments. All of these possibilities should be vigorously pursued.

The international law enforcement strategy is clearly not the total solution to the drug addiction problem. A two-pronged approach is needed—rehabilitation of those who are now addicted and law enforcement and education to prevent the spread of heroin addiction. Here are some of the elements of a total approach to drug addiction:

REHABILITATION OF ADDICTS

Any serious assault on the drug addiction problem must include an extensive rehabilitation program. A broad range of treatment facilities excluding heroin maintenance, must be available; we must seek to guarantee that any addict seeking treatment can gain access to a suitable modality of treatment. Vocational training and counseling and other supportive services must be available and we must attempt to eliminate unfair job discrimination against ex-addicts. Today there are waiting lists in our methadone programs; methadone is frequently the only treatment available—although, for many addicts, such as young veterans who have been addicted only a short time, methadone may not be suitable—and supportive services are frequently absent. Even if it were possible to suddenly stop the flow of heroin into this country and prevent more people from becoming addicted, there are already more than a half million heroin addicts in our country who need treatment.

DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT

Domestic law enforcement efforts must be pursued as an adjunct to the international control effort, to make it as difficult as possible for the heroin traffickers to operate. Law enforcement efforts should be directed not at the street level pushers who are usually addicts themselves but at those who organize, promote, and profiteer from the spread of heroin addiction.

Even if the domestic and international control efforts cannot eliminate the heroin traffic, it is reasonable to hope that they can reduce heroin availability on the street and curtail experimentation and thus help stop the spread of addiction— although confirmed addicts will still do whatever is necessary to obtain the drug.

DRUG EDUCATION

Like the law enforcement effort, drug education programs that frankly and openly present the facts about various drugs can help discourage experimentation with heroin among youths.

We have heard that drug education is the highest priority of this government. Yet the drug education budget for fiscal 1972 in the Office of Education was $13 million—one fourth the cost of one C–5A transport.

OTHER DRUGS

International enforcement efforts must not be limited to heroin. Other drugs, including cocaine, methadone, and barbiturates, must be included; they are problems now and could become more serious if heroin becomes scarce. Synthetic drugs equivalent to heroin may also become available. Control efforts must be pursued now before these problems grow.

UNDERLYING SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Solving basic problems of poverty, alienation, and lack of opportunity will be the key to a long range solution of our drug problems. Until the underlying social causes of drug abuse can be cured, drug abuse cannot be completely eliminated. As long as the belief persists that it is possible to solve problems by taking drugs, it will always be possible that a new drug problem could emerge.

These considerations, however, should not discourage us from making an immediate effort, pursuing every possible avenue, to cure the heroin plague. Heroin overshadows all other drugs in its disastrous impact on our lives. Heroin is responsible for much of the crime, violence, and insecurity that haunt urban life; heroin addiction has destroyed the lives of hundreds of thouands of addicts; and heroin trafficking has fueled the growth of organized crime. Heroin is our worst drug problem and solving it would immensely contribute to improving the quality of our lives.

The effort to solve the heroin problem must cease to be fragmented and haphazard. We must pursue it with the same determination and seriousness of purpose that we invested in the Manhattan project and the space race.

CONCLUSION

The difficulties in attempting to control the international narcotics trade are obvious. Opium is grown in many countries and total U.S. consumption is small compared to worldwide production. The intention in this presentation is not to propose panaceas or to paper over problems but rather to clarify some of the reasons for past failures and to point the way toward a more realistic effort. International enforcement efforts are not the full answer to the drug problem nor is Southeast Asia the only opium-growing area that could replace Turkey in supplying the U.S. market. But our failure to face up to the problem in Southeast Asia has been on major reason for the failure of the "total war" that was declared on heroin. The Nation must face up squarely to the fact that Southeast Asia is fast becoming this Nation's major heroin supplier.

It would be wrong to see only the problems that beset the international control effort. There are also some important facts which indicate that an international control strategy will have some reasonable prospect of success. The poppy has a long growing period and is easily detected from the air or by satellite. Poppy cultivation is possible only in certain fairly restricted climates. Cultivating the poppy is exceptionally demanding: few who are not accustomed to that life would be willing to adopt it. Consequently, the international syndicates will not easily be able to persuade farmers elsewhere to cultivate the poppy, if they lose their source of supply in the Golden Triangle.

In the 1950's Iran was able to gain control over remote hill tribes and halt opium production. Indian and China have had considerable success in controlling the ilicit production of opium and preventing diversion into illegal channels. Turkey's recent agreement to terminate opium production—culminate a decade of negotiation and pressure—illustrates what can be achieved, when narcotics control is made a top priority. It is now time to place cracking down on the heroin trade at the top of the agenda in our relations will all of the nations involved. No objective we are pursuing in Vietnam is so important as to justify jeopardizing our efforts to control the heroin trade.

JOHN McMILLAN

SPEECH OF

HON. JAMIE L. WHITTEN

OF MISSISSIPPI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 13, 1972

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, it is with genuine regret that I realize that our good friend and colleague from South Carolina JOHN MCMILLAN, will not be with us in the new Congress. Through the years I know of no public servant who has rendered more conscientious service, who has been a better spokesman for his district and for his Nation, than has JOHN.

He has never been too busy to deal with the problems of his constituents before committees, on the floor, and elsewhere. Through that period of time he has carried lots of extra work here in the Congress and truly, we all are indebted to him for many of the good things that have happened in our Nation; and I say,

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Remarks:

Attached is the text of a speech which Representative Rangel made on the floor of the House on the drug problem. He said nothing about his requests to us for our drug studies but made several other references to the Agency which I have underlined.

[redacted]
Acting Legislative Counsel

cc: DCI via Ex/Dir (27 Oct)
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